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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 17234

NATHAN J. HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted on two counts of burglary
in violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended, pursuant to a plea of admission made in the Third
District Juvenile Court in Utah County on the 30th day of
January 1980, the Honorable Merrill L. Hermansen, judge
presiding.

Specifically the charge was unlawfully remaining

in a building with the intent to commit theft.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On April 16, 1980 appellant made a motion to
withdraw and change his plea of admission, on the sole ground
that he entered the admission without the assistance of counsel.
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His motion was denied on May 20, 1980 by Judge Hermansen.
On the same date Judge Hermansen ordered appellant to pay
$50.38 and committed him to the Youth Development Center.
However, the cornrnittment was stayed on the condition that
appellant take a job and pay $100 per month restitution.
In addition, appellant was placed in the control of the
Division of Family Services.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's
conviction, as well as affirmance of the Order denying the
motion to withdraw appellant's plea of admission.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At the outset it must be noted that the proceedings
on January 30, 1980, when the appellant's plea of

admissi~

was made and entered, was not recorded and thus no transcript
of those proceedings is available for this appeal.

Rather,

the juvenile court judge has provided a memorandum dated June '
1980, recounting what occurred at the proceedings.

The record

on appeal contains this merr.orandum, certain minute entries
of the court, the court's findings of fact and decree, the
juvenile court petition, and the appellant's motion for change
of plea accompanied by an affidavit of the appellant's father,,
and from these documents the following statement of facts
is made:
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On January 30, 1980, appellant, accompanied by
his father and his probation officer, came before Judge
Hermansen in the Third Judicial Juvenile Court pursuant
to charges that he had remained in the offices of or.
Robert J. Peterson and Dr. Larry J. Broadbent with the
intent to commit theft in violation of Section 76-6-202,
Utah Code Code Annotated (1953), as amended.

The charges

against appellant were read and explained.

Although the

exact title and section of the Utah Code was not read orally
at the proceedings, appellant and his father were previously
made aware of the title and section of the Utah Code charged
in the summons, which had been previously served on them.
Judge Hermansen informed appellant and his father that
appellant had a right to consult with counsel before entry
of the plea, and that the charges against appellant were
very serious.

Appellant indicated that he did not wish to

consult legal counsel.

The judge then asked the appellant's

father whether he felt that the decision to waive the right
to legal counsel was a good and prudent decision and the
father expressly supported the decision.

The judge did not

instruct the appellant as to the possible consequences of
pleading an

admission to the charge but again advised that

it was a very serious charge.

Eased upon these facts, the

judge concluded that the right to counsel had been knowingly
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waived and accepted the plea of admission.
On April 16, 1980, appellant filed a motion for
change of plea on the sole ground that he had entered his
admission without the assistance of counsel.

In an affidavit

of appellant's father, attached to the motion, it was alleged
that the father understood the charges to be in the nature of
a trespass rather than burglary based on conversations he

h~

earlier had with appellant's probation officer and that
admission t6 the charge with other charges was necessary in
order to clear the record and place appellant in the "Tracke:
Program."

The father further alleged that based on this

understanding, he advised his son to admit all of the charges.
The father finally alleged that after the January 30, 1980
hearing, he discovered the evidence in the case and believed
that his son did not commit burglary but rather criminal
trespass.

After a hearing on this motion, Judge Hermansen

denied the motion on May 20, 1980, having concluded that he
had fully advised appellant and his father of their rights
to an attorney and that they had knowingly waived the right
to counsel prior to entering the admission to the charge.
The Court then entered an order that appellant pay $50.38
restitution and that he be committed to the Youth Developmen:
Center with that order stayed on the condition he take a job

1

and pay $100.00 a month towards restitution, an d th a t appell'I
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I

be placed in the care, custody, control and guardianship
of the Division of Family Services for appropriate placement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT AN
INDIGENT JUVENILE BE AFFORDED COUNSEL
IN A DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING WHICH
DOES NOT RESULT IN HIS CONFINEMENT.
The sole issue raised by appellant on appeal is
that the waiver of his right to counsel prior to the entry
of his plea of admission was neither voluntarily nor intelligently made and therefore the juvenile court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw the admission.
Respondent submits that since appellant did not
receive a sentence of incarceration as a result of his plea
of admission, he may not be heard to complain that he was
denied his right to counsel at the juvenile court proceedings.
A juvenile's right to counsel in a delinquency
proceeding was established in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87
S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 528 (1967).

The Gault decision

followed two Supreme court decisions, which established that
defendants in criminal proceedings charged with capital crimes
or felonies have a constitutional right to be represented
by counsel.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 s.ct. 55,

77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83

~

I
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s.ct. 729, 9 L.Ed.2d 799

(1963).

However, the scope of a

juvenile's right to counsel in a delinquency proceeding
was limited by Gault to proceedings where there is a risk
of confinement.

The Court in Gault stated:

We conclude that the Due Proccess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is
curtailed, the child and his parents must
be potified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel retained by them,
or if they are unable to afford counsel,
that counsel will be appointed to represent the child.
875 S.Ct. 1451.
The direction that this area of the law has taken
in criminal proceedings in recent years establishes a pattern'
which is helpful in determining the scope of a juvenile's
right to counsel.

In the case of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 401

U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the Supreme
Court extended the right to counsel to any criminal proceedinc
where the defendant may be incarcerated.

However, Argersi~

appeared to leave open the question of whether an indigent
in a criminal proceeding had a right to counsel where: he was
not, in fact, incarcerated.

This question was answered~

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d
383 (1979).

In Scott, the defendant was convicted of theft.

The applicable Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for :
the offense as $500.00 fine or one year in jail or both.
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The defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel
and fined $50.00; whereupon he appealed, claiming he had been
denied the right to counsel.

The Supreme Court held:

. the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution require
only that no indigent criminal defendant
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
unless the State has afforded him the
right to assistance of appointed counsel
in his defense.
99 s.ct. 1162.
Thus, the right to counsel in criminal proceedings
does not extend to proceedings which do not result in the
confinement of the accused.
The Court in Scott reasoned there was a sound basis
for drawing the line between those proceedings which result
in confinement, and those where there is only a risk of
confinement such as a fine.

The Court stated at 99 S.Ct. 1162

that "Actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from
fines or the mere threat of imprisonment."
Respondent asserts that the Scott decision and the
analysis contained therein have application to juvenile
proceedings.

Because the considerations, stated above, upon

which the Scott decision was based are analogous to the
considerations present in juvenile proceedings, respondent
asserts that the Scott decision should be followed in establishing the scope of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings.
Respondent submits that the due process clause of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

constitution only requires that no indigent juvenile be
confined unless the state has afforded him the right to
counsel.
In the instant case appellant was charged with
delinquency based on two felony counts of burglary in
violation of section 76-6-202, Utah Code Ann.
amended.

(1953), as

On January 30, 1980, appellant made a plea of

admission to the charge.

As a result of appellant's

conviction he was ordered to pay restitution of $50.38
and he was placed in the care of the Division of Family
Services.

The order to be placed in the Youth Development

Center was stayed.

Therefore, because appellant was not

confined he was not denied due process by pleading guilty
without the assistance of counsel.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE APPELLANT
HAD EFFECTIVELY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL.
Section 77-24-3, Utah Code Ann.

(1953), as amended,

provides that the Court anytime before judgment may withdra~
a plea of guilty and substitute in a plea of not guilty.
(See also Section 78-3a-46, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) .)

However,

this section does not give a defendant an automatic right to
. .
. thin the
withdraw his guilty plea, but places the decision w1
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sound discretion of the trial court.
P.2d 337
1977).

State v. Forsyth, 560

(Utah 1977); State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d 156 (Utah
This Court in Forsyth stated

"the trial judge is

allowed considerable latitude in the exercise of that
discretion, which the appellate court will not interfere
with unless it plainly appears there was an abuse thereof."
Id. at 339.

The facts of the instant case do not demonstrate

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
First, appellant was properly instructed on his
right to counsel and he effectively waived that right.

It

is well-settled that the right to counsel in a criminal
proceeding can be waived by the defendant.

Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 u.s. 458, 58 s.ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 322 U.S. 708, 68 s.ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1947).
The waiver of a juvenile's right to counsel in delinquency
proceedings was established in Utah in State v. Spiers, 12
U.2d 14, 361 P.2d 509 (1961).

Johnson, supra, stated that

whether a waiver has been effective in criminal proceeding
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case including
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
In Spiers, this court likewise applied this standard
to juvenile proceedings.

Even though there is a presumption

against waiver of the right to counsel, both Johnson and Spiers
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placed the burden on the defendant to establish he did
not effectively waive his constitutional rights.

The

Court in Spiers stated: "the burden is on the defendant
to show he has been denied his constitutional rights."
Id. at 511.
As already indicated, this Court in Spiers
stated that the issue of whether there has been an effective
waiver of the right to counsel depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.

In Spiers this court indicated '

that three of those factors were background, experience and
conduct of the accused.

The Arizona Supreme Court in Suiter

v. Kurtz, 1 .h.riz. App. 348, 403 P.2d 3 (1965), reviewinq

al~

year old juvenile's waiver of counsel, considered the followi:
factors: age, education, literacy, prior courtroom experience,,
I

financial condition, mental state, inducements, haste in
proceedings, absence of relatives, complexity of charge,
and knowledge of legal procedure.
All of these factors should be considered in
answering the question of whether appellant intelligent~•~
I

voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Moreover, the burde:i

is on the appellant to establish that in view of all these
factors his waiver was ineffective.

Appellant in his brief

only focuses on his age, his father's understanding of the
charges and the effect of pleading guilty, and the court' 5
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instructions at the time the plea was made.
Appellant recognizes that a juvenile can waive
his right to counsel.
146 F.2d 867

However, he cites Williams v. Huff,

(D.C. Cir. 1945), which states that where the

defendant is a juvenile, a rebuttable inference is created
that the waiver of counsel is not intelligently made.

In

the instant case that inference is rebutted by the fact that
appellant's father, who was present when the plea was made,
concurred with his son that they did not want to consult
with counsel.
Appellant also claims that his father misunderstood
the charges.

However, it appears there is no objective proof

to support this claim.

The only evidence that appellant's

father misunderstood the charges is the father's unsupported
affidavit.

Appellant further claims that his probation

officer told his father that admission of the charges would
clear the record and expedite the placing of appellant on
the Tracker Program.

However, appellant does not claim that

this advice was incorrect or improper.

These facts indicate

that caution should be used in assessing the reliability of
appellant's assertions.

The New Jersey court in In Re State

The Interest of R.M., 105 S.Ct. 372, 252 A.2d 237 (1969),
stated that they would find that a juvenile had effectively
waived his right to counsel if they were satisfied from the
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--circumstances that " ( 1) defendant knew he had a right to
counsel;

(2) he failed to avail himself of that right

wi~

a full understanding of the implications and consequences
of a plea of guilty;

(3) he nevertheless submitted the

plea entirely voluntarily."
The facts of the instant case satisfy these
requirements.

On January 30, 19 80, the day appellant pled

guilty, he was fourteen years and 9 months old.

Present

with the appellant were his father and his probation officer.'
The charge against appellant was read and then the Court
explained to him what the charges were.

The court informed

appellant and his father that he had a right to counsel.
However, they indicated to the Court that they did not wish
to consult counsel even after the court questioned them as
to whether this decision was advisable.
Finally, appellant makes no claim that due to lack
of mental capacity or education he did not understand the
proceedings, nor does he claim that fear, stress, or any
other inducements influenced his decision to plead guilty.
In short, appellant knew he had a right to counsel, and
there is no evidence to show that appellant's plea was not
intelligently and voluntarily made.
Respondent asserts that appellant has not met hi 5
burden of showing that he did not waive his right to counsel!
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intelligently.

The juvenile judge, who was in a position

to know whether appellant's waiver of counsel was intelligently made, concluded that it was and denied appellant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Absent a clear showing

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
appellant's motion, the denial should stand.
Finally, appellant adds the additional argument
that his waiver of his right to counsel was unknowingly made
because the juvenile court judge did not advise him of the
maximum possible penalty he might receive if he pled guilty.
It must be stressed that appellant does not assert that
his plea was involuntarily and unintelligently made on this
basis.

Rather he limits his claim to the waiver of counsel

issue.

Indeed, the right to counsel question was the only

basis of appellant's motion to withdraw his plea in the court
below.

When viewed in this context, respondent re-asserts

that because the maximum penalty of incarceration was not
assessed in this case, appellant's right to counsel was not
violated.

Moreover, appellant's cases, to wit, State v.

Banford, 13 U.2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 (1962) and Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 322 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (H47),
become distinguishable.

Although these cases establish that

before a guilty plea can be accepted the Court must explain
what the consequences of making that plea are, nevertheless,
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there are notable differences between the instant case
and Von Moltke and Banford, which operate against allowing
appellant to withdraw his plea on that ground.

In

~

and Von Moltke the defendants, after entering their guilty
pleas, were sentenced to prison terms.
only ordered to pay $50.38 restitution.
a penalty different in kind from a fine.

Here appellant was
Imprisonment is
A fine does not

involve the serious intrusion into the life of the accused
that imprisonment does.

Where the accused may be imprisoned

1

as a consequence of pleading guilty, it is critical that he
be aware of that possibility because of the substantial
impact imprisonment would have on his life.

His awareness

that he may be confined may substantially influence his
decision to plead guilty.

In the instant case, where appellar.:I

was ordered to pay $50.38, and make restitution, there has

[

not been a substantial intrusion into his life.

I
I

The Court in Von Moltke stated that before a judge
could discharge its duty the judge must investigate as long
and as thoroughly as the circumstances in the case demanded.
The facts in Von Moltke demanded that the judge make a
comprehensive and penetrating examination of all the circumstances in the case.

In the instant case, where appella~

was aware of the consequences of pleading guilty, the judge
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I

I

I

discharged his duty by reading and explaining the charges
to appellant and the father and by informing them of their
right to counsel.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that, where appellant was not
confined as a result of his conviction, he was not denied
due process by pleading guilty without the assistance of
counsel.

However, if this Court finds appellant did have

a right to an attorney, respondent submits that an examination
of the circumstances at the time appellant pled guilty shows
his waiver of his right to counsel was intelligently and
voluntarily made.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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